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LAWSUIT. By Stuart M. Speiser. New York: Horizon Press. 
1980. Pp. v, 617. $40; paper $12.50. 
The size of tort damages awards and their impact on industry 
have increased phenomenally in the twentieth century. After the 
1974 crash of a DC-10 outside Orly Airport in Paris, for example, 
Turkish Airlines and its insurers paid a total of $62,268,750 to settle 
340 wrongful death actions. The trend toward ever-larger awards 
and settlements has alarmed many observers and resulted in a 
number of proposals for reform. As long ago as 1880, Professor 
Thomas M. Cooley suggested a $5000 limit on compensatory dam-
ages for wrongful death;1 more recently, other commentators have 
endorsed similar ceilings2 and revisions in the contingent fee sys-
tem. 3 Whether one views the trend as good or bad, however, de-
pends on one's perspective. From the perspective of Stuart Speiser, 
an aviation tort law specialist and a practicing plaintiffs' attorney, 
larger and more frequent judgments should be encouraged because 
they provide one of the few effective checks on corporate abuse of 
individual rights. 
In his most recent book, Lawsuit, Speiser draws upon his exten-
sive experience in aviation tort litigation to construct a defense of the 
personal injury bar and the contingent fee system. Without contin-
gent fees, Speiser argues, many injuries would go unredressed and a 
valuable deterrent to irresponsible business practices would be lost. 
The "entrepreneur-lawyer,"4 he claims, has become a vital link in 
I. T. COOLEY, A. TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 274 (1880). 
2. See, e.g., Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lollery: Compensation and Selective Reim• 
bursement, 53 VA. L. REv. 774, 798-802 (1967). 
3. Legal scholars have debated many of the questions surrounding the contingent fee sys-
tem. See, e.g., F. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES (1964). But Lowsult 
is addressed primarily to the layman. 
4. The "entrepreneur-lawyer'' is the tort lawyer who is willing to incur substantial costs in 
advance of trial in exchange for a contingent fee. Pp. 144-54. 
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the remedial process: If lawyers were unwilling to invest their time 
and money to pursue large contingent fees, few individuals could 
afford to sue big corporations. 
Speiser develops this thesis largely through accounts of important 
cases. He recounts, for example, the procedural gymnastics per-
formed by General Motors against Ralph Nader in the labyrinthine 
New York court system. Had Nader been paying hourly attorneys' 
fees, Speiser argues, General Motors would have attempted to ex-
haust his resources by further delaying the trial. Under the contin-
gent fee system, corporate defendants are less able to wear down 
their opponents because many plaintiffs' lawyers will advance the 
costs of expensive litigation. By preserving meritorious lawsuits and 
prolonging the attendant adverse publicity, therefore, the contingent 
fee system makes corporate defendants more willing to settle. 5 This 
process, as well as the prospect of substantial awards, 6 has enabled 
entrepreneur-lawyers to deter the marketing of an inestimable 
number of unsafe products (pp. 342-45). 
The contingent fee system, Speiser posits, has magnified the de-
terrent effect of litigation on manufacturers not only by increasing 
plaintiffs' stamina, but also by improving the quality of the plaintiffs' 
bar. Until recently, tort plaintiffs were often represented by poorly 
prepared lawyers who depended on volume for an adequate income, 
and opposed by defense attorneys who were paid by the hour and 
unconcerned with the cost of trial preparation. A significant portion 
of the plaintiffs' bar, Speiser believes, has become "scientific" in its 
use of sophisticated evidence, exhaustive investigative techniques, 
and expert witnesses (p. 560). "Scientific" trial preparation, how-
ever, can be enormously expensive. Without the incentive of large 
contingent fees, lawyers would be unwilling or unable to undertake 
and prepare properly risky products liability suits. By contributing 
to the preparedness of plaintiffs' attorneys, Speiser maintains, these 
large fees have promoted compensation and deterrence (pp. 341-48). 
Although Speiser's argument is credible, it is weakened by his 
overbroad and sometimes unsupported statements. He asserts, for 
example, that "[m]illions of people have been and will be spared se-
rious injuries or death because of the deterrent effect of litigation on 
manufacturers" (p. 343). He provides no support for this claim or 
for his conclusion that "[o]nly the threats oflarge money judgments 
5. According to Speiser, General Motors eventually settled the Nader case when it realized 
that negative press coverage of each new development in the litigation was producing a net loss 
from continued defense. Pp. 99-100. 
6. Speiser points, for example, to the award of $125 million in punitive damages in one 
Ford Pinto case. The punitive damage award was eventually reduced by the trial judge on 
remittitur. Ford refused to pay even the $3.5 million reduced award, but the judgment was 
upheld on appeal. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 357, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 
(1981). 
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and loss of cheap insurance coverage have brought safety progress in 
most American industries" (p. 348). The assumptions underlying 
Speiser's argument - that the threat of liability can alter the behav-
ior of corporate managers and that injuries result from defects that 
were known to those managers and correctable at a reasonable cost 
- are not universally accepted, but he makes no attempt to justify 
them. 
In his eagerness to praise the tort liability system, moreover, 
Speiser overlooks a number of fundamental defects. Many plaintiffs 
go uncompensated while others receive astronomical awards; the 
system is painfully slow and expensive to administer; and lawyers 
may often be the big winners. 7 Speiser fails to mention that in many 
cases, liability is unchallenged and attorneys can hardly be said to 
earn their contingent fees. Thus, while Lawsuit may serve a valuable 
role in rehabilitating the public's opinion of plaintiffs' attorneys, 
many readers will find its lack of balance distressing. 
Nevertheless, Speiser's book is worth reading. The work lacks 
the depth necessary t9 satisfy legal scholars, but its intended audi-
ence - the general public - should find it interesting and informa-
tive. Unfortunately, Speiser's rambling anecdotal approach, 
undoubtedly designed to provide color and hold the reader's atten-
tion, may frustrate comprehension of the book's deeper message. 
Many pages are devoted to patting the backs of colleagues, self-ag-
grandizement, and conveying irrelevant information. Despite its 
shortcomings, Lawsuit brings a unique perspective to a complex and 
misunderstood legal dilemma; although opponents of the contingent 
fee system will undoubtedly ask for equal time, Speiser has contrib-
uted substantially to the debate. 8 
7. See generally Franklin, Stlpra note 2. 
8. Speiser's book has also been reviewed by Braun, Book Review, 1981 DET. C. L. REV, 
251; Callen, Book Review, 5 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 711 (1980); Cordiano, Book Review, 28 
U. KAN. L. REV. 575 (1980); Le Bel, Book Review, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 838 (1981); and Wilkins, 
Book Review, 14 AKRON L. REV. 535 (1981). 
